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ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING AND THE
STANDAIRD OIL DECISION: THE IMPACT




In 1975, a number of oil refiners' in response to amended regula-
tions2 issued by the Federal Energy Administration, 'adopted a non-
product costs first sequence of recovery3 which enabled them to recover
their non-product or non-oil costs4 before they recovered their product
* Energy Consultant, Coopers & Lybrand, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Fairleigh Dickinson
University- J.D., Temple University School of Law.
1. 10 C.F.R. § 212.31 (1980).
"Refiner" means a firm (other than a reseller or retailer) or that part of such a firm which
refines covered products or blends and substantially changes covered products, or refines
liquid hydrocarbons from oil and gas field gases, or recovers liquefied petroleum gases
incident to petroleum refining and sells those products to resellers, retailers, reseller-
retailers or ultimate consumers. "Refiner" includes any owner of covered products
which contracts to have those covered products refined and then sells the refined covered
products to resellers, retailers, reseller-retailers or ultimate consumers.
Id
2. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,368 (1974) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(d) (1980)).
3. Pursuant to the amendments adopted, effective January 1, 1975, refiners used three meth-
ods of recovering increased costs: The NPCI first method, where non-product cost increases were
first recovered; the NPCI last method, where product cost increases were recovered first; and the
proportional method, where increased costs were recovered pro rata. Standard Oil Co. v. Depart-
ment of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1037 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
4. 10 C.F.R. § 212.83 (1980). The categories of non-product costs which a refiner could pass
through as price increases include: (1) refinery fuel cost increase, calculated according to the
weighted average cost of refinery fuel per unit of energy (dollars per million British Thermal Units
(BTU)); (2) labor cost increase, referring to the "total dollar amount of direct and indirect
renumeration or inducement for personal services which are reasonably subject to valuation for
those personnel employed at the refinery. . . operations, including that portion of [contract costs]
between a refiner and an outside entity attributable to personnel other than employees that per-
form such services"; (3) additive cost increase or "the total dollar amount of costs incurred for
materials and compounds . . . which are added to, use [sic] for, or blended with crude oil or
covered products during or in conjunction with the refining process to produce products other
than gasoline"; (4) utility cost increase; (5) interest cost increase; (6) container cost increase or "the
dollar amount of costs incurred for containers. . . used by the refiner for storing or packaging
[price-controlled] products"; (7) federal, state, and local tax cost increase including the dollar
1
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.or raw material cost increases.5 The recovery of non-product costs and
product costs by these refiners was a justification for price increases in
petroleum products which would be passed through to and absorbed by
the consumer since prices for refined petroleum products had been fro-
zen at a May 15, 1973 base price level.6
It was important for these refiners to recover their non-product
costs first because the increased product costs could be banked 7 for re-
coupment at a later time while non-product cost increases were banned
from banking, thus making the recovery of product cost increases less
immediate than the recovery of non-product costs.
At issue in Standard Oil Co. v. Department ofEnergy8 was the Fed-
eral Energy Administration's9 (FEA) disallowance of the non-product
amount of federal, state, and local property, excise, franchise and other similar taxes but not
including income taxes; (8) maintenance cost increase; and (9) depreciation cost increase, referring
to the cost attributable to the depreciation of refinery and storage capacity and equipment in-
stalled, provided that such costs are computed according to the generally accepted accounting
practices historically and consistently applied by the refiner. Id § 212.83(c)(2)(iii)(E)(1)-(9).
5. The cost of product or raw material, for purposes of crude oil, is the purchase price plus
the cost of transportation. Increased product costs for petroleum products other than crude oil is
the purchase price including transportation costs.
"Increased product costs" means the "increased costs of crude oil" plus the "increased
costs of products purchased" and is the sum of (1) the difference between the costs of
crude oil during the month of measurement and the cost of crude oil during the month of
May 1973 plus (2) the difference between the cost of products purchased during the
month of measurement and the costs of products purchased during the month of May
1973. If a particular petroleum product was neither purchased nor landed during the
month of May 1973, the cost of that petroleum product in May 1973 shall be imputed to
be the lowest price at or above which at least 10 percent of that product was priced by the
refiner in transactions during the month of May 1973.
Id § 212.82.
6. The regulations establish the maximum allowable price for regulated petroleum products
as "the weighted average price at which the covered product was lawfully priced in transactions
with the class of purchaser concerned on May 15, 1973, plus increased product costs and increased
non-product costs incurred between the month of [the transaction] and the month of May 1973."
Id § 212.83(a)(2) (1974).
The May 15, 1973 base price structure was an important component of the Phase IV regula-
tions which established rules governing the pricing of petroleum products. 596 F.2d at 1035.
7. Increased costs incurred in a month of measurement and not recovered in the current
month may be carried forward or "banked" for recovery in subsequent months. 10 C.F.R.
§ 212.83(e)(4) (1980). The ban on banking non-product cost increases was issued November 29,
1974, and published December 5, 1974. The FEA failed to publish the regulation prior to its
effective date pursuant to the procedural requirements of the Federal Energy Administration Act,
15 U.S.C. § 766(i)(1)(B) (1976), thereby rendering the regulation invalid. 596 F.2d at 1037.
8. 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
9. The Federal Energy Administration was the agency responsible for regulating the petro-
leum industry before its incorporation into the Department of Energy on October i, 1977. On
May 7, 1974, the Federal Energy Administration Act (FEAA) was signed into law. Pub. L. No.
93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). In June, 1974, the
FEA was delegated the authority to implement the allocation and price stabilization provisions of
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA), Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976)).
2
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costs first sequence of recovery. In February 1976, without notice of
the rule making and without providing an opportunity to comment, the
FEA ruled'0 that the refiners were required to recover all product costs
before any non-product cost increases could be passed through. The
FEA made this ruling both prospective and retroactive to 1975, and
maintained that the refiners' misinterpretation of the non-product cost
rules enabled them to net about one billion dollars" from the recovery
of non-product cost increases. The FEA later rescinded the regulation
but wanted to enforce its substance for the year 1975. The refiners as-
serted that the effect of this ruling would have been a disincentive to
building refined petroleum product inventories which could have led to
product shortages in periods of peak demands.'" The refiners con-
tended that no express sequence of recovery rule had been adopted
prior to the February 1, 1976 rule making and that the February rule
was the first explicit statement of a product costs increase first interpre-
tation.
The issue to be examined in this article' 3 concerns whether the
February 1976 regulation was a "substantive" rule to which the notice
and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act'4 (APA)
and the Federal Energy Administration Act' 5 (FEAA) applied or
10. 10 C.F.R. § 212.85 (removed 41 Fed. Reg. 15,339 (1976)).
I1. In a notice proposing a class exception, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,282 (1976), the Federal Energy
Administration recognized that the regulations were interpreted by refiners to authorize a propor-
tional computation of increased product and non-product costs, whether or not all available in-
creased product costs had been recovered first. According to an FEA survey of 104 refiners, there
was a substantial cost impact on consumers during the thirteen month period, January 1, 1975,
through January 31, 1976, resulting from the different interpretations applied by refiners. In view
of the alleged refiner misinterpretations, the FEA claimed that: (I) The amount to be recovered
under the "proportional" interpretation of the regulations advanced in the proposed class excep-
tion was $3.6 billion. (2) The amount to be recovered under the "sequential" interpretation of the
regulations, requiring pass-through of all increased product costs first was $2.4 billion. (3) The
difference between the proportional and sequential interpretation was $1.3 billion. [1977] EN.
MANAGEMENT (CCH) 9546.
12. Refiners of regulated petroleum products or covered products are linked to their May 15,
1973 base profit margin. Although refiners may recover increased product and non-product costs
by use of the pass through device, the system is not without its disadvantages. For example, as a
refiner's costs increase and its sales prices rise, the refiners profit margin becomes a smaller per-
centage of its gross income. Refiners tied to the 1973 profit margin may lack capital or incentive
to expand their production and marketing. Williams, Monograph 44, in 2 ENERGY LAW SERVICE
§ 4A.06 at 10 (H. Green ed. 1978).
13. The other issues dealt with by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals were jus-
ticiability, the requirement that refiners recover all product costs first, contemporaneous construc-
tion of the rule as requiring refiners to follow the non-product costs last sequence of recovery, and
summary judgment. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1978).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
15. 15 id § 776.
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whether it was an "interpretative" rule and thus exempt from procedu-
ral requirements. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held in
Standard Oil that the FEA was required to adhere to the procedural
safeguards of both the APA and the FEAA and that the FEA's post-
February "interpretation" of the pre-February rule was, because of am-
biguous wording and the FEA's own actions, a substantive change in
policy to which these procedures applied. 6
II. THE REGULATORY SETTING OF STANDARD OIL
A. The Regulatory Framework
The imposition of price controls on crude oil and petroleum prod-
ucts was made in response to an emergency situation, specifically, in-
creases in the price of oil brought on by the Arab oil embargo of 1973
and inflationary trends in the American economy in the early 1970's. 17
Initially, the petroleum industry operated under the same regulations
which governed the manufacturing and reselling industries. From 1971
to 1973, the petroleum industry was subjected to the Phase I and Phase
II price controls 8 which originated under the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970."9 This law delegated to the President of the United States
the statutory authority to impose a ninety day freeze on prices, rents,
wages, and salaries, a measure designed to halt inflation and provide
economic stability.20 The Phase I price freeze limited all prices of
goods and services in the economy to their August 15, 1971 levels.
Thus, in the petroleum industry the price of gasoline would be frozen
16. Standard Oil was the result of an appeal by the DOE and a consolidation of multi-district
litigation. In Ohio, nine refiners (Sohio, Sun, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, Shell, Amoco, Arco, and Ex-
xon) instituted suit to prevent the FEA from retroactively applying a new interpretation to an
existing rule. The court held for the oil companies. Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203,
243-44 (N.D. Ohio 1978). In Delaware, six refiners (Phillips, Tenneco, Pennzoil, Coastal States
Gas, Conoco, and Amerada Hess) filed similar suits. The Delaware court also ruled for the oil
companies in holding that the FEA attempted to change its rules without notice or an opportunity
for a hearing, in violation of the APA and the FEAA. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Department of Energy,
449 F. Supp. 760, 800 (D. Del. 1978).
17. Erickson, Peters, Spann, & Tese, The Political Economy of Crude Oil Price Controls, 18
NAT. REsoURCES J. 787 (1978). OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, insti-
tuted an oil embargo primarily in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 and eventually
quadrupled the world price of crude oil. Id.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20,139 (1971), amended, Exec. Order No. 11,630, 36
Fed. Reg. 21,023 (1971).
19. Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 796, 799 (expired under its own terms, Pub. L. No.
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at its traditionally high summer price while middle distillates2 would
be frozen at seasonally low prices.22 In keeping with his statutory au-
thority,2" the President was authorized to make adjustments "necessary
to prevent gross inequities" in allowing for price increases above the
August 15, 1971 freeze levels to the extent they reflected cost in-
creases.24 This adjustment was contained in the Phase IV controls and
stated that manufacturers and resellers could recover cost increases but
only to the extent of product cost increases.2 - When the responsibility
for regulating crude oil and petroleum products later shifted from the
statutory authority under the Economic Stabilization Act to the Cost of
Living Council26 then to the Federal Energy Office 27 then to the FEA2 8
and finally to the Department of Energy,29 the refiner industry argued
that the regulations in effect did not expressly impose a sequence of
cost recovery. The oil refiners interpreted the regulations to allow two
kinds of recovery; the recovery of non-product cost increases before the
recovery of product cost increases or a recovery of both types of costs
proportionally. It is this interpretation by the refiners and a contrary
one by the FEA, disallowing the recovery of non-product cost increases
first, that formed the basis of the dispute between the industry and the
government.
Phase IV marked the assertion of tighter control over the petro-
leum industry.3" Controls were imposed on production from the oil
21. Middle distillates include "Nos. 1 and 2 heating oils, Nos. I-D and 2-D diesel fuels,
kerosene, and aviation fuels." 10 C.F.R. § 212.31 (1980).
22. Erickson, Peters, Spann & Tese, supra note 17, at 788.
23. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 744-45 (D.D.C. 1971)
(upholding the delegation of the legislative power to the President and the Cost of Living Council,
the panel initially responsible for regulating crude oil and petroleum products).
24. See notes 19 & 20 supra.
25. 38 Fed. Reg. 6283 (1973); HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS ON THE ECONOMIC STABILIZA-
TION PROGRAM 1261-91 (1975).
26. The Cost of Living Council's petroleum pricing authority was derived from the authority
of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The cost of
Living Council was established under Exec. Order No. 11,617, 36 Fed. Reg. 17,813 (1971).
27. Exec. Order No. 11,748, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,575 (1973). The Federal Energy Office was
delegated authority to implement the allocation and price stabilization provisions of the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976).
When petroleum price control responsibilities were transferred, the Federal Energy Office
was granted enormous discretion in establishing a price control program. See, e.g., California v.
Simon, 506 F.2d 430 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In June, 1974, the President abolished the
Federal Energy Office and replaced it with the Federal Energy Administration. Exec. Order No.
11,790, 39 Fed. Reg. 23,185 (1974).
29. The Federal Energy Administration was incorporated into the Department of Energy on
October 1, 1977. 42 U.S.C. § 7151(a) (Supp. III 1979).
30. The Phase III program seemed to be a reversal of the Phase I and II policies in that it
5
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well and marketing at the retail gasoline station.3' According to these
controls, refiners could increase product prices above the base level
only to the extent they reflected increased crude and purchased product
costs on a dollar for dollar basis. This allowed the recouping and pass-
ing along of costs to the consumer only as the costs were incurred.
B. The Petroleum Price Regulations
The Phase IV price regulations implemented the basic petroleum
price controls in effect between January 1, 1975, and January 31,
1976.32
The most important aspect of the price regulations is the base pe-
riod price level provision. Refiners were permitted to maintain their
May 15, 1973 profit margin while recovering increased costs by charg-
ing increased sales prices.33 A refiner's determination of the maximum
price it could charge for gasoline during any month began with the
price at which gasoline was lawfully priced by the refiner in transac-
tions with the relevant class of purchaser3 4 on May 15, 1973. Added to
this were increased product costs and increased non-product costs in-
curred by the refiner between the preceding month and May 1973.35
Although a price freeze such as that set out above may work in an
emergency situation, it has been argued that a system of price and allo-
cation controls on crude oil and refined petroleum products obscured
the economic effects of shortages and stoppages produced by the price
controls.36 This is just one illustration of the nearly constant contro-
provided for voluntarily applied price adjustments. This led to such a sharp increase in distillate
prices that the Cost of Living Council took measures which reimposed mandatory price controls
on the sale of crude and petroleum products. See Erickson, Peters, Spann & Tese, supra note 17,
at 789.
31. Refiners' base prices were frozen at the May 15, 1973 level. On September 28, 1973,
retailer margin levels were frozen at the May 15, 1973 level. Id
32. 38 Fed. Reg. 6283 (1973).
33. As a refiner-seller's costs increase and its sales prices rise, the profit margin becomes a
smaller percentage of the refiner-seller's gross income. Note 12 supra.
34. A class of purchaser is a group of customers charged a comparable price for comparable
goods in light of ordinary price differentials between those customers and other customers. 10
C.F.R. § 212.31 (1980). For example, an independent jobber with whom an oil company has dealt
often would receive more favorable price treatment, possibly in the form of regular increased
deliveries, than a jobber new to dealing with the company.
35. 41 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5117-23 (1976) (codified in part in 10 C.F.R. §§212.31, 212.82-.85,
212.92, 212.132 (1977)).
36. The refiners argued that an "evil" of the price control system was that it set prices so low
as to reduce incentives for hard work, innovation or investment. Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 440 F.
Supp. 328 (N.D. Ohio 1977). See also Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1090 (1971). Slawson suggested the removal of price controls and their replace-
ment by a requirement to pay profits in excess of a percentage of equity to the government.
[Vol. 16:453
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/3
ADMINISTATIVE RULE MAKING
versy between the industry and the regulators. Another example of the
differences involves the increased costs provision of the regulations.37
Under that section, a refiner "may increase" its May 15, 1973 selling
prices to reflect the increased costs of imported and domestic crude pe-
troleum. Because of this wording, the Ohio District Court in Standard
Oil stated that the refiners could either pass through increased product
costs by adding them to base prices under the increased costs provision
or by banking the costs and passing them through at another time.38
The FEA argued that the word "may" was misinterpreted by the court
and that a fixed base price definition was compelled by the interpreta-
tion. On appeal, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals found
that the FEA did not intend its use of the word "may" to be
mandatory.39 The court ignored the FEA's argument that it was im-
plicit in the regulations that the word "may" was not intended to give
refiners the discretion to vary their base prices by including in the base
price less product cost increases than required by the cost increase
formula.4°
This conflict between the petroleum industry and the FEA over
petroleum price regulations, their form and substance, culminated on
February 1, 1976 with the issuance of a regulation4' in which the FEA,
for the first time, explicitly stated a sequence of cost recovery for refin-
ers. It required that all product cost increases must be recovered before
non-product cost increases and again established the old rule that all
non-product cost increases which were not passed through could not be
banked.42  The conflict caused by this regulation came before the
37. 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(1)(i) (1975).
(c) Allocation of increased product costs-(1) General rule-(i) Specialproducts. In
computing base prices for sales of a special product, a refiner may increase its May 15,
1973 selling prices to each class of purchaser once each calendar month beginning with
November 1973 by an amount to reflect the increased product costs attributable to sales
of that special product using the differential between the month of measurement and the
month of May 1973 provided that the amount of increased costs used in computing a
base price is calculated by use of the general formula set forth in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of
this section.
Id
38. Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203, 225 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
39. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1043 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978).
40. Id
41. Sequence of recoupment of costs, 10 C.F.R. § 212.85 (1976) (removed 41 Fed. Reg.
15,339 (1976)).
42. (a) Refiners subject only to Subpart E. For purposes of calculating recoupment of
increased costs under § 212.83, costs shall be deemed to have been recovered in prices
charged in a current month "u" only in the following sequence:
(1) All increased costs of crude oil incurred during the month two months before
1981]
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Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals in Standard Oil.
III. SUBSTANTIVE OR INTERPRETATIVE RULE MAKING IN STANDARD
OIL
A. D§fnitional Approach
Under § 551(4) of the Administrative Procedure Act,43 a rule is
"the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular ap-
plicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency. . ... I4 The February regulation under
consideration meets the APA's definition of a rule. It stated that all
product costs must be passed through into increased purchaser prices
before any non-product costs could be similarly passed through. 5
A substantive rule has been described as the "administrative
equivalent of a statute, compelling compliance with its terms on the
part of those within the agency ambit. '46 Because substantive rules
the current month ("t=l") and not passed through in the immediately preceding month("t"),
(2) All increased costs of crude oil incurred in the month of measurement ("t"),
(3) (i) Increased costs of crude oil incurred three or more months before the cur-
rent month ("u") and not passed through by the immediately preceding month ("t"),
Provided, That the portion of such amount deemed to have been recovered in the current
month ("u") shall not exceed 10 percent of the highest total such amount as of the end of
any month prior to the current month "u" (no such costs will exist until March 31, 1976),
and
(ii) Increased costs of crude oil incurred through December 31, 1975 and not
passed through as of January 31, 1976, and not passed through by the immediately pre-
ceding month ("t"), Provided, That the portion of such amount deemed to have been
passed through in the current month "u" shall not exceed 10 percent of the total such
amount as of January 31, 1976,
(4) The amount of increased costs attributable to products purchased after Decem-
ber 31, 1975 and not recovered through the month of measurement ("t"), represented by
the symbol "B" in the formulae in § 212.83(c), and
(5) Increased non-product costs.
41 Fed. Reg. 5120 (1976) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 212.85) (removed 41 Fed. Reg. 15,339 (1976))
(emphasis added).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
44. Id Rule making is to be distinguished from adjudication. While adjudication applies to
specific individuals, rule making has a "general application to all members of a broadly identifi-
able class." American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir.) (Bur-
ger, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
45. Note 48 supra. For a description of the rule's provisions, see text accompanying note 48
supra. Under 10 C.F.R. § 212.81 (1975), the rule was applicable to all refiners.
46. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 58, at 154 (1976); cf People v. Widelitz, 39 Misc.
2d 51, 239 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (defining rule as any type of legislative or quasi-legislative
norm prescribing future conduct).
K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 5.03, at 126 (3d ed. 1972), states that using the term
"substantive" is misleading because the term also indicates rules that are not procedural and that
"legislative" is deemed preferable to designate rules that are not interpretative. Id For purposes
8
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create law by changing existing rights and obligations, they are subject
to the APA rule making procedures including publication and an op-
portunity for the affected group to comment.4 7
In determining whether the February rule was substantive or in-
terpretative, one may attempt to determine whether the rule imple-
mented or interpreted FEA requirements. If the rule implemented the
law, it would be a substantive rulemaking to which certain procedural
requirements apply.4" If the rule merely interpreted already existing
law or policy, it would be deemed interpretative and the procedural
requirements would not apply.49 Another method used to distinguish
between substantive and interpretative rule making involves characteri-
zation of the rule. Rules that are new, in the sense that they more than
merely clarify uncertainty in an existing statute or regulation, will be
of this article, the term "substantive" will be used for several reasons. This was the term used in
Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). Sec-
ondly, the Federal Energy Administration attached the substantive label to the rule making. Fi-
nally, the extent of the rule's effect on the industry justifies the label "substantive."
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
48. Id. § 553(b)-(d).
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor [sic] in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views,
or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of
the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be
made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this
title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than
30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the
rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
d
49. Id § 553(b)(3)(A).
9
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deemed substantive." A third point of distinction deals with delega-
tion. When the legislature has delegated power to the administrative
agency to make a rule having the force of law,5' rules promulgated
pursuant to that power must be issued in accordance with procedural
requirements. z
In Standard Oil, the non-product costs last rule was declared sub-
stantive, but because it did not comply with procedural requirements it
was held invalid.53 Judge Jameson disagreed with at least one scholar54
who contended that a court may no more substitute its judgment on the
content of a substantive rule than it may substitute its judgment on the
content of a statute.55 This judicial deference doctrine can be explained
by the recognition of administrative expertise developed through the
implementation and enforcement of statutes and regulations. 6 The
Standard Oil court gave effect to this doctrine by labeling an agency's
interpretation controlling unless it is deemed clearly erroneousY7
Nonetheless, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals made an ex-
ception in Standard Oil because the FEA's interpretation of the rule
was erroneous and inconsistent with FEA regulations, stating that "def-
erence to an agency's interpretation is not a hard and fast rule."58
Unlike a substantive rule, an interpretative rule has been defined
as a clarification or explanation of existing laws or regulations.5 9 Inter-
pretative rules state what an administrative agency believes a statute or
regulation already means. It is distinguished from the substantive rule
in that courts have extensive powers to review interpretative rules60 and
50. 596 F.2d at 1061. Because the FEA had not issued a sequence of cost recovery rule prior
to February, 1976, the February rule was held to be substantive.
51. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, § 59, at 157. Once an administrative agency promulgates
regulations, they have the force of law. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974); United
States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960).
52. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, § 59, at 157.
53. 596 F.2d at 1069.
54. K. DAVIS, supra note 46.
55. Id § 5.03, at 126.
56. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964).
57. 596 F.2d at 1055.
58. Id at 1056 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). "The weight to be
given to an administrative interpretation depends upon the thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id
In Standard Oil, the non-product costs last rule was held invalid due to the FEA's failure to
comply with procedural requirements. 596 F.2d--at 1069. In addition to lack of procedure, an
administrative rule may be declared invalid if it is unconstitutional or if it was promulgated with-
out statutory authority. K. DAVIS, supra note 46, § 5.06, at 137.
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there is no requirement of notice and comment.6 An interpretative
rule is not legally binding, but is merely the agency's construction of
the law it is required to administer.6" Despite being subject to extensive
judicial review, interpretative rules tend to acquire great weight
through the judicial deference normally paid them by the courts.63 In
Standard Oil, the FEA contended that the February ruling was not the
legislation of a new law but merely a clarification of what the law had
always been and therefore an interpretative rule.6 4 This line of argu-
ment is questionable because even the FEA admitted that the non-
product costs increase last method announced in February was the first
explicit statement of such a sequence of cost recovery.
Despite the fervor of the FEA's implicit meaning argument, it was
rejected by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals65 and earlier
by the Ohio District Court66 in a decision which labeled the FEA's
explanation a "masquerade".67 The district court also found that prior
to the February rulemaking, the FEA did not give notice that it re-
quired an all product costs first sequence for the recoupment of in-
creased product and non-product costs. 68  Because the FEA's
regulations never expressly addressed an all product costs first se-
quence of cost recovery during the January 1, 1975 through January 31,
1976 time period, the district court refused to give effect to the FEA's
intended meaning before the issuance of the sequence of recoupment of
costs regulation.69
Although interpretative rules do not of themselves affect legal
rights and obligations, there are two factors that increase the weight or
61. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A), (d)(1) (1976).
62. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, § 55, at 144.
63. 596 F.2d at 1055-56.
64. Id at 1060.
Although FEO believes that its interpretation of the meaning of the language used
in the regulations is correct-i.e., increased product costs were required to be recovered
first; banking of unrecovered increased non-product costs was not permitted-it never-
theless acknowledges that refiners might have concluded in good faith that recoupment
on a proportional basis was permitted as a result of possibly ambiguous language in
§ 212.83(d) and certain information disseminated by the FEA.
41 Fed. Reg. 33,282, 33,283 (1976).
65. 596 F.2d at 1061.
66. Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203, 243-44 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
67. In adopting the all product costs first theory of increased cost recovery, the FEA and
its predecessor agencies never complied with these procedural requirements. The FEA
continues to rely on the masquerade that compliance with these requirements was not
necessary because it never changed the implicit requirements of the regulations.
Id at 243.
68. Id at 245.
69. 10 C.F.R. § 212.85 (removed 41 Fed. Reg. 15,339 (1976)).
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authoritative effect of interpretative rules: the expertise of the adminis-
trative agency combined with the lack of expertise of the court, and the
"contemporaneous construction" given the regulation by administra-
tive officials.70 Because the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
held that the language of the February regulation along with the lan-
guage of prior regulations made it a substantive rule, additional factors
were not substantially considered in Standard Oil.7 t
The definitional problem of substantive and interpretative rule
making was given conclusive treatment by the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of En-
ergy.72 This opinion examined an FEA ruling which interpreted the
stripper well exemption.73 The Court held that it was an interpretative
ruling exempt from the notice and comment procedures of both the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Energy Administration
Act. Because the ruling interpreted the statutory stripper well exemp-
tion defined in the existing regulation,7 4 it was held to be interpretative
by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. It did not create
"new" law, but merely clarified interpretation of the regulation.
B. Procedural Requirements
Interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice are exempt from the notice
and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.7" The
policy behind the procedural requirements of the Act recognizes that
the public deserves a role in the making of rules. The lack of a public
role in many instances has resulted in the reluctance of the courts to
give administrative agencies total discretion in defining the rule
70. K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 5.03, at 127.
71. The factors of administrative expertise and contemporaneous construction do, however,
demonstrate how untenable the FEA's position was. Administrative expertise of the FEA is un-
questioned, but in the area of petroleum cases, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has
developed its own expertise. This would decrease the weight to be given to any FEA rule. See
Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 574 F.2d 512 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
More importantly, in the case of the non-product costs last rule, the contemporaneous con-
struction given the regulation by individual FEA officials was inconsistent with the FEA's conten-
tions. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203, 212 (N.D, Ohio 1978).
72. 589 F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
73. The ruling excluded injected wells from well count for the purpose of applying the ex-
emption from allocation and price regulations accorded crude petroleum produced by stripper
wells. Id at 1087. A stripper well is defined as one that has an average daily production of 10
barrels per day or less during the preceding 12 month period. 10 C.F.R. § 212.54(c) (1980); 15
TULSA L.J. 597, 603 n.33 (1980).
74. 10 C.F.R. § 210.32 (1974) (deleted 41 Fed. Reg. 4931 (1976)).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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issued. 6 The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency,
before adopting a rule, publish notice of the proposed rule77 and pro-
vide interested parties an opportunity to comment on it.78  Notice is
required because the rule making is of little value to the affected parties
if it is unannounced in advance. Since administrative agencies are not
representative bodies, the opportunity to comment protects private in-
terests.
Although violations of procedural requirements by the Cost of
Living Council had been tolerated,79 a reversal of this position was ap-
parent in Tasty Baking Co. v. Cost of Living Council."° A Cost of Liv-
ing Council order which denied Tasty Baking's request for exemption
from Phase II regulations limiting Tasty's profit margin was held inva-
lid because the Cost of Living Council relied on regulations promul-
gated without proper notice several months after Phase II price controls
were instituted. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals stated
that "regulations may stand if the court can take judicial notice of the
legislation and the accompanying regulations."" l Chief Judge Tamm,
however, disagreed with the Cost of Living Council's position that the
regulations were basically codifications of prior definition and policy."2
The court carefully weighed the Council's authority stating that Coiin-
cil action was not arbitrary and capricious where administrative control
had been congressionally authorized provided there had been a 'ra-
tional basis" for the agency's conclusions.83 Seemingly, it is only in
cases of "cavalier disregard" of procedural requirements that an ad-
ministrative agency rule making will be declared invalid.
76. A new method of determining whether or not a rule is subject to § 553 procedures has
developed. The basis for exemption from rule-making requirements is not the rule's interpretative
nature but instead, the rule's importance to those regulated and to the public-the substantial
effect. To determine a rule's substantial effect, the courts look to the complexity and pervasiveness
of the rule issued, the degree of departure from former practices resulting from the rule, and the
confusion created by practical difficulties of compliance with the new rule. Note, Administrative
Law-The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction: Semantical Feinting with an Exception to
Rulemaking Procedures, 54 N.C.L. REv. 421, 425 (1976).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) "General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in
the Federal Register . I. " ld.
78. Id § 553(c). "After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested per-
sons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id
79. California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974).
80. 529 F.2d 1005 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
81. Id at 1014.
82. Id
83. Id at 1011-14.
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C. Promulgation of the Non-Product Costs Increase Last Rule
On February 1, 1976, the Federal Energy Administration an-
nounced a regulation which required that product costs, including
banked costs,84 were required to be recovered before any non-product
costs were recovered." In addition, non-product costs could not be
banked for recoupment at a later date. In Standard Oil, the refiners
contended that no express sequence of recovery rule had been adopted
by the FEA prior to February 1, 1976.86 Throughout the relevant pe-
riod there was little concern about the sequence of cost recovery by the
refiners and the FEA. In its preamble to the February regulation 7 the
FEA insisted that the new rule entailed no change in the regulatory
framework although it admitted that the prior regulations were silent
concerning the order of cost recovery.88 The FEA acknowledged that
the combination of the ban on banking non-product cost increases and
the non-product costs increase last sequence of recovery rule would
have had several undesirable effects including inflation, disincentive for
refiners to build up inventories, and incentive to decrease refinery pro-
duction."9 The rule would have compelled refiners to recover all costs
currently to minimize absorption and would have forced them to rely
on imported, purchased products since refinery production cost in-
creases, including labor and fuel, could not be banked. Subsequently,
the FEA proposed a class exception to permit all refiners to recompute
their increased cost recoveries during the relevant period using the pro-
portional cost recovery approach. 90 The FEA concluded that refiners
in "good faith" may have misinterpreted the regulations to allow re-
coupment on a proportional basis as a result of ambiguous language in
the regulation.
Despite its acknowledgement of hardship on refiners, the FEA ar-
84. Note 7 supra.
85. 10 C.F.R. § 212.85 (removed 41 Fed. Reg. 15,339 (1976)).
86. Suit was brought against the FEA in Ohio and Delaware challenging the FEA interpreta-
tion of cost pass through regulations requiring refiners to allocate monthly sales revenues first to
the recoupment of all increased product costs and then to the recoupment of non-product costs.
The suits were filed against the FEA after it declined to grant the plaintiff refiners in Ohio and
Delaware a class exception from the impact of its ruling. The distinction between the Ohio and
Delaware litigation is that all of the Delaware plaintiffs recovered their product and non-product
cost increases under the proportional method, while a majority of the Ohio plaintiffs used the non-
product costs increase first method. 596 F.2d at 1033-34.
87. 41 Fed. Reg. 5111-20 (1976).
88. Nonetheless, the FEA attempted to assert that the February regulation was identical to
the regulations then in effect. 596 F.2d at 1038.
89. 41 Fed. Reg. 15,330, 15,331 (1976).
90. d at 33,282, 33,283.
[Vol. 16:453
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/3
ADMINISTRA TIVE RULE MAKING
gued that the regulations in effect during 1975 and January 1976 "com-
pelled" this sequence of recovery. 9' The Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals distinguished statutory authority from disregard of statu-
tory rule making procedures in finding that the FEA's non-product
costs increase last recovery rule was a reasonable interpretation of ex-
isting regulations and did not exceed the FEA's statutory authority.92
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals agreed with the Ohio
District Court that "had the agency issued regulations which actually
embodied that interpretation, pursuant to the required statutory proce-
dures mandating prior publication, notice, and an opportunity to com-
ment, such an interpretation would have been valid for the time frame
January 1, 1975 through January 31, 1976.""9 The FEA's all product
costs first interpretation was consistent with its statutory authority
under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.94
In resolving the issue whether the non-product costs increase last
rule was substantive or interpretative, the label the administrative
agency put upon its exercise of power was indeterminative. What was
important was "what the agency did in fact." 95 Because the FEA's ac-
tion resulted in a new rule with palpable effects upon the petroleum
industry, the action should have been substantive and therefore subject
to procedural requirements.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
The refiners interpretation of the sequence of cost recovery can be
analogized to the injustice of retroactivity in criminal cases. A defend-
ant cannot predict that a later legislative decision will make the con-
duct in which he engaged criminal. Similarly, the refiners did not
receive explicit instructions from the FEA on the method of cost recov-
ery. Because the refiners relied on a tripartite sequence of recovery, the
retroactive operation of a rule constricting the methods of cost recovery
would be inherently unfair.96 Indeed, the refiners' challenge to the
FEA's statutory authority was successful in Standard Oil indicating
91. 596 F.2d at 1060.
92. Id at 1069.
93. 453 F. Supp. at 245.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976).
95. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1972).
96. See Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ry., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) (holding that a court's
refusal to apply the law the court believes to be right to a particular case is not a denial of due
process when the court is trying to avoid the undesirable effect of making a change retroactive).
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both a search for fairness as well as a new higher level of judicial scru-
tiny of administrative agency decisions.
Perhaps because the court understood the crisis situation to have
passed by 1978, it asserted increased authority over the FEA in the
Standard Oil decision. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
has shown a reluctance to accept "good cause" or other excuses for
noncompliance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Federal Energy Administration Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The February 1, 1976 non-product costs increase last regulation
was ambiguous. Confusion and uncertainty existed among both FEA
officials and refiners. While the existing regulation could have been
reasonably interpreted as imposing a non-product costs increase last
sequency of recovery, it was the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals' opinion that the interpretation was not compelling and could
have been construed as imposing no particular sequence of recovery.
But because the FEA's post-February 1 interpretation of the pre-Feb-
ruary 1 rule was a substantive change in policy to which procedural
rules of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Energy Ad-
ministration Act applied, the FEA's failure to follow the procedures
invalidated the February rule.
The court, in deciding the issue of FEA adherence to rule making
procedures, followed a three step analysis. First, because the non-
product costs last rule was articulated for only the first time it was a
"new" or substantive rule; it did not interpret an already existing regu-
lation. Since the refiners had placed much reliance on a non-product
costs first interpretation of the pre-February regulation, a similar statu-
tory procedure had to be followed in giving effect to the February regu-
lation. Yet the FEA attempted to effect a rule change without notice or
opportunity for comment. In fact, Judge Jameson stated that the regu-
lation was a substantive one and outside the statutory authority of the
FEA but it failed because of its procedural defects. Third, because the
rule was not validly adopted it could not be made retroactive. A retro-
active application would have unduly burdened those refiners who had
relied on the non-product costs last sequence of recovery.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT
On January 28, 1981, President Reagan signed an Executive Or-
der 97 exempting all crude oil and refined petroleum products from the
Mandatory Price and Allocation Regulations adopted pursuant to the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.
Despite immediate deregulation, the enforcement arm of the De-
partment of Energy remains operative for the period prior to decontrol.
The Department has recently settled a number of price control viola-
tion cases involving overcharges by major refiners.98 Pending over-
charge cases arising under the Standard Oil sequence of cost recovery
decision await resolution either through negotiation and refund settle-
ment or through litigation.
97. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1981).
98. Ten Oil Concerns Settle Charges of Overpricing, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1981, at 10, col. 2.
19811
17
Stavitsky: Administrative Rule Making and the Standard Oil Decision: The Imp
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
